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THE PROSUBSTITUTION TREND
IN MODERN PHARMACY LAW
Sidney H. Willig*
When the consumer reposes a high level of trust and confidence
in the expertise of a provider of goods or services, the law com-
monly treats this vendor in a fashion different from the manner in
which it treats other suppliers of goods and services. Accordingly,
the law regulates the professions to a greater extent than other
occupations. This scrutiny stems largely from the inability of the
public to protect itself adequately in a situation where its mem-
bers engage the professional on the understanding that he will put
their interests before his own. Because the professional is deemed
to be a fiduciary, the rule of caveat emptor does not apply. This is
clearly the case with the professional pharmacist. He stands as a
fiduciary for most transactions, and particularly in the case of
prescription drugs, the public must trust the ability of the phar-
macist to dispense properly those commodities on which health
and life may depend.
Most patrons of commercial pharmacies assume that when they
purchase a particular nonprescription article and ask the pharma-
cist for the item by brand name, they will receive the requested
brand and no other. The consumer will generally be able to detect
whether the pharamacist has complied with his request. Through
advertising, recommendation, and other forms of promotion, the
consumer will often have been apprised of the distinct nature of
the commodity he seeks to purchase. Because brand name
nonprescription pharmaceuticals are often packaged in a readily
recognizable form, the consumer will usually be in a position to
discern differences among items.
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Cosmetic Law Unit, Institute for Law and the Health Sciences, Temple University.
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A different situation arises where the physician prescribes a
particular product for a patient's use. The patient-buyer sees the
product in only its final form, usually packaged by the pharmacist
himself rather than by the manufacturer.' As a result, the package
received by the buyer is unlikely to bear the commercially dis-
tinguishing features which permit the buyer to protect himself in
the nonprescription drug context. Barring an inordinate amount of
technical knowledge on the part of the consumer, he will be
unable to discern whether he has actually received the product
that the physician has prescribed. 2
A discrepancy between the drug prescribed and the drug dis-
pensed can result from either intentional or negligent action by the
pharmacist. In the first instance, contrary to the ethics of his
profession, an unscrupulous pharmacist may intentionally dis-
pense an imitation or cheaper "equivalent" or even a nonequiva-
lent item rather than the prescribed product. An intentional action
of this variety will often be for the pharmacist's own economic
benefit or that of another. In the second instance, the discrepancy
is the result of an error by a careless pharmacist in dispensing the
prescribed drug. Any act resulting in a variation between the
prescription pharmaceutical requested and that pharmaceutical
dispensed is technically known to the law governing pharmacy as
"substitution." 3 Both federal and state legislation have proscribed
the practice of substitution.4 Undoubtedly both negligent and
intentional substitution result from the actions of a small number
of pharmacy practitioners. 5 The problem is nevertheless one of
great significance to pharmacists in general.
This article explores the legal problems presented to the prac-
ticing pharmacist by drug substitution. It delineates the practical
and economic realities bearing on substitution and the arguments
I Galbally, Substitution as "Gross Immorality," 12 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 758, 761
(1957).
2 Id.
3 It has been stated that the practice we now call substitution dates at least to the eighth
century B.C. The practice at that time involved substituting an entirely different compound
which looked or tasted like the prescribed one. Id. at 758; Ulrich, The Generic Drug
Dispute in Louisiana, 117 J. LA. ST. MED. Soc. 141, 142 (1965).
4 Ulrich, supra note 3, at 142-43, reports that the practice has been illegal at least since
the year 1227 A.D. when Emperor Frederick II prohibited substitution without the
consent of the prescribing physician. A discussion of the current state of antisubstitution
law in the United States will be found in the text accompanying notes 103-52 infra.
5Estimates vary as to the amount of substitution engaged in by practicing pharmacists.
Galbally, supra note I, at 758 n.2, cites a survey by theAmerican Druggist Magazine
finding that substitution in the prescription drug context had occurred in 3.7 percent of
prescriptions filled in 1957, as compared with a 14.7 percent rate in 1953. A recent
investigation by the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare, disclosed that in 24 percent
of the drugstores audited a pharmacist was guilty of some inegularity in dispensing
prescriptions. Ulrich, supra note 3, at 143-44.
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both in favor of and against limited legal substitution. After de-
scribing the current status of the law on the subject and the
various resultant liabilities of the pharmacist, the article then
suggests means by which substitution might be made an accept-
able practice in certain circumstances.
1. SUBSTITUTION
In broadest terms, substitution may be defined as the replace-
ment of an ordered or prescribed drug by another substance
where the replacement is neither authorized by nor revealed to
the person ordering or prescribing the item.6 The failure of the
pharmacist to dispense a requested nonprescription item can re-
sult in various civil and other liabilities. 7 Where a prescription
article is involved, the person who has prescribed is generally not
the purchaser. Both state and federal laws provide that many
drugs may be prescribed only by authorized persons. 8 Thus in the
prescription drug context the prescriber is the physician, while the
purchaser is the patient. Substitution occurs when the pharmacist
replaces the item prescribed by the physician without the physi-
cian's prior consent. Thus in both instances the proscribed act
requires that (1) the dispensed drug differ from the order or
prescription, and (2) that the replacement occur without the prior
consent of the person ordering the article. 9 This definition encom-
passes the situation in which the prescriber orders a particular
brand name and the pharmacist replaces the requested brand
name item with a similar or equivalent pharmaceutical having a
different brand name.10
Within this general definition, a variety of circumstances can be
hypothesized in which substitution will be held to have occurred.
An analysis of these varieties of substitution is useful in consid-
6 Galbally,supra note 1, at 758; Ulrich, supra note 3, at 142.
7 Liabilities to be incurred by the pharmacist in such a situation are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 103-52 infra. See also Dunlap v. OakCliff Pharmacy, 288 S.W. 236
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
8 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1970);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1119 (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6810 (McKinney 1972);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- 4(x) (1964).
9 See, e.g., Galbally, supra note I, at 758. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.110(u)
(1967) provides in part:
"'Substitute" means to dispense without prescriber's authorization a different
drug or brand of drug in place of the drug or brand of drug ordered or
prescribed.
10 It is this particular form of substitution which has been the focus of debate. See text
accompanying notes 59- 102 infra. See also MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1101(u)
(1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-6-28(l) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §6816 (McKinney
1972): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,§ 390-5(8) (1968).
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ering the need and possibilities for reform in substitution law.
There may be policies weighing for the retention of substitution
laws in some cases which are not present in others.
A. Negligent Substitution
The classic case of substitution is that of the pharmacist who
negligently dispenses a commodity which differs from that or-
dered or prescribed.11 In this instance the erroneous substitution
is unknown to patient, prescriber, and dispenser. It would seem
that because none of the parties is aware of the substitution or
able to consent to it in advance of dispensing the commodity,
substitution of this variety should never be legally permissible.
B. Intentional Substitution
1. Known Only to the Pharmacist-A more perplexing prob-
lem is involved where the pharmacist intentionally replaces the
prescribed drug with another.1 2 In this case, an intent to violate
ethical principles and applicable law is involved. The intention to
substitute may result from a number of motives, including consid-
erations of the economic welfare of the patient and a desire on the
part of the pharmacist himself for economic gain.13 His desire
may be to charge the patient the price for a relatively expensive
brand name product while actually dispensing a lower priced
imitation, counterfeit, or equivalent. 14 A pharmacist's concern
may also extend to the notion that by reducing the prices he
charges his customers he will be able to compete with other
pharmacists who engage in this unethical and illegal practice.
Intentional substitution may take another form. Upon receipt of
a prescription for a brand name drug, the pharmacist may dis-
pense a lower priced equivalent of the drug and charge the patient
the lower price rather than the higher price of the brand name.
11See, e.g., Brown v. Marshall, 47 Mich. 576, I1 N.W. 392 (1882); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), motion for leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich.
753 (197 1); Wilson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 208 N.Y. 108, 101 N.E. 799 (1913). It
appears that negligent substitution was the only sort known before various groups actively
sought to expand the definition to include brand name substitution. A STUDY OF ADMINIS-
TERED PRICES IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st. Sess. 235-38
(1961) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES].
1 2See, e.g., Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 38 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978, 94 A.L.R. 726
(1934) (customer knew of substitution but had been misled by pharmacist as to nature of
substituted item).
13 Galbally, supra note 1, at 762.
14 This was the technique allegedly employed in a recent Louisiana welfare fraud case.
See Ulrich, supra note 3, at 141. See also Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Weinberg, 60 F.2d
461 (3d Cir. 1932).
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There are considerable economic pressures on the pharmacist to
follow this practice. His inventory position is considerably en-
hanced if he is able to stock only one brand of the article rather
than a multitude of brand name equivalents. 15 His competitive
position vis-4-vis other commercial pharmacies may be main-
tained or advanced by offering the consumer-patient a lower
priced drug. 16 The commercial pharmacist must always live with
the possibility that if he does not provide the lower priced item,
his competition will. A further pressure bearing on the prac-
titioner involves those who regularly deal with patients receiving
some sort of public subsidy for medical care. In some instances
public health service organizations will reimburse a pharmacist
only on the basis of an average price list, even though the pre-
scribing physician has requested a brand name pharmaceutical. 17
These various economic pressures on the pharmacist place him,
therefore, in an undesirable economic and professional position.
2. Known to the Pharmacist and Patient-Other forms of sub-
stitution may be evident in which the prescriber does not consent
to a replacement of the article he has ordered. The pharmacist
may obtain the consent of the patient himself to substitute an-
other, and presumably less expensive, commodity. In effect, the
pharmacist and patient have combined their judgment to modify
the physician's prescription. This presently violates both the spirit
and the letter of Durham-Humphrey Act where the drug is one
legitimately distributed only pursuant to prescription. 18 Arguably,
this course of action should be approved by law in order to allow
economic considerations to influence the otherwise scientific
problem of drug selection. Additionally, a pharmacist may request
that a physician change his prescription in light of economic or
clinical considerations. If the physician declines, the pharmacist is
bound legally and ethically to honor this decision. If the pre-
15 With synthetic penicillin, for example, there are at least six different brand names.
ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 1I, at 223. If a pharmacist were able to carry
only one of these brands in inventory (and not necessarily the least expensive), his cost
savings could be substantial. Often the pharmacist will prefer to stock one well-known
brand since physicians will more likely agree to a change to that brand.
16 At least two situations can be envisioned here: first, simply in terms of added sales
volume that may result from a lower level of prices; second, where the pharmacist is out of
stock on a particular item and must either substitute or forgo a sale.
17 For example, Kentucky reimburses druggists on the basis of a list of average prices.
TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, CURRENT AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PROGRAMS 59
(HEW 1968) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS].
Ninety-five per cent of all prescriptions in the United States are written by brand name.
Ulrich, supra note 3, at 141. In instances where reimbursement for a brand name pre-
scription is on some sort of average price basis, the pharmacist faces a choice of substitut-
ing, refusing to fill the prescription, asking the patient to absorb the difference, or absorb-
ing the difference himself.
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act§ 503, 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1970).
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scribing physician approves, substitution is no longer in issue
because the pharmacist has in effect received a new prescription.
3. Known to the Pharmacist and a Third Party-Under some
circumstances substitution may occur at the request of a third
party. The most controversial of these arrangements arises where
a public authority is paying for prescriptions to be received by the
patient. The public authority may instruct the physician or phar-
macist that prescriptions are to be filled only with the least ex-
pensive product available and may also ask the physician so to
prescribe. Similarly, the public authority may reimburse the phar-
macist only on the basis of an average price list.19 Whether the
directive is to a pharmacist employed by the authority in its own
pharmacy or to an independent commercial practitioner, the ethic-
al and legal problems are similar, even though there is a vast
difference in the economic pressures faced by each. 20
Finally, a variety of substitution by consent is often employed
under what is known as a formulary organization system. Often
employed by large hospitals, this arrangement commonly involves
a committee of physicians, administrators, and pharmacists that
decides which drugs will be used in the hospital. When a physi-
cian prescribes a brand name, generally on a blank which bears a
legend stating the pharmacist may choose the formulary equiv-
alent unless the doctor specifies contrarily, the pharmacist dis-
penses the equivalent drug selected for use at the hospital 21 Such
a system requires prior consent from all physicians in the health
service unit. This formulary system may not fall within the gener-
al definition of substitution because the physician-prescriber has
consented in advance to all substitutions by agreeing to the hospi-
tal by-laws as well as by often using the hospital prescription
blank described previously. Yet he has not consented to each
19 This method was employed as to physicians by Louisiana after the investigation
conducted by the Department of Public Welfare. Ulrich, supra note 3, at 141. It has also
been employed in California. TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 39-52.
An average price system of reimbursement is also used in Kentucky. See id. at 53-61. For
a detailed summary of these reimbursement systems, see id. at 37. See generally COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF PRICING METHODS USED BY
VARIOUS STATES IN THE PURCHASE OF PRESCRIBED DRUGS UNDER FEDERALLY AIDED
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1967).
20 The economic pressure on the pharmacist appears to be increasing every year. It has
been estimated that combined federal and state expenditures for public assistance payment
programs totaled 200 million dollars in 1968, as compared with approximately eighteen
million dollars in 1957. TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 36.
21 For discussions of the operation and legal implications of the hospital formulary
system, see Woods, Hospital Formularies -Possible Liability Risks for Injuries to
Patients, 19 Bus. LAW. 1007 (1964); Statement, Guiding Principles on the Operation of
the Hospital Formulary System, 21 AM. J. HOSPITAL PHARMACY 40 (1964); TASK FORCE
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, FINAL REPORT 38-40 (HEW 1969) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE FINAL REPORT].
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individual substitution in an "informed" manner because in prac-
tice only the pharmacist or purchasing agent may know the exact
drug available for the prescription order.
It should be evident that all varieties of substitution may not
deserve uniform legal treatment. In the instance of negligent sub-
stitution, it can be persuasively aruged that current anti-
substitution laws serve a valid purpose in holding pharmacists
to a high standard of care by deterring and punishing substitution
that occurs without the consent or knowledge of any of the parties
to the transaction. In the case of intentional substitution under-
taken by the pharmacist for his benefit alone, a similar conclusion
is appropriate since the pharmacist is essentially perpetrating a
fraud. In contrast, where the practitioner substitutes a lower
priced equivalent and charges the patient for the less expensive
pharmaceutical, the pharmacist may really be tempering the phy-
sician's scientific judgment with a consideration of economic fac-
tors. This concern for economic factors may serve the pharma-
cist's economic interests, but it is purportedly also in the patient's
economic interest. Most physicians believe, however, that the
patient's primary interest is a health interest. Furthermore, be-
cause the physician is the patient's primary agent in serving that
interest, tampering with the physician's judgment without his
knowledge is a dangerous activity. The patient at least ought to be
made aware of the pharmacist's decision and be able to ratify it.
While this may not satisfy the present state and federal statutes, it
at least indicates nonfraudulent conduct by the pharmacist.
The focus of this article is the legal and practical problems
involved in substitution where demonstrably equivalent drugs are
involved. It has been argued that this variety of substitution
should be legally permissible. 22 Presumably, only that substitution
which occurs when the drug prescribed and the drug dispensed
are truly equivalent should be eligible for permission. It is pos-
sible that substitution of this sort may also be useful where the
substitution is authorized by a third party who pays for the pre-
scription.
II. PHARMACEUTICAL EQUIVALENCE
The most frequently discussed issue in the substitution con-
troversy is that of the equivalence of the two drugs involved in
any particular case. Considerable debate has been generated on
the existence of so-called "generic equivalency." The argument
22 See text accompanying notes 64-94 injra.
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for substitution in limited instances rests on the proposition that
when a physician prescribes a brand name product, about 20
percent of the time there are equivalent and possibly less ex-
pensive products which would be appropriate for use in treatment.
When a pharmaceutical is compounded, there will always be a
chemical name to describe the active ingredient or ingredients
contained. The chemical name conveys information concerning
the structure and components of the compound. 23 Because the
chemical name is not often conducive to facile communication, 24
the same compound usually will bear one or more generic names.
The generic name is also commonly referred to as the usual,
nonproprietary, established, or official name.25 Finally, the manu-
facturer may compose a proprietary or brand name for his form of
the generic product. Frequently this brand name is protected by a
trademark. 26 This trade name represents an attempt by the manu-
facturer or distributor to distinguish his product from other similar
or even identical products.2 7 The debate over substitution has
centered on whether the law should permit generic name or other
brand name drugs to be substituted for the prescribed brand name
23 ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 11, at 223. For example, the chemical name
of a synthetic penicillin is alphaphenoxyethyl penicillin potassium. Id.24 See, e.g., note 23, supra. The chemical name for Meprobamate is 2-Meythl 2-
n-propyl-l, 3 propanediol dicarbamate. Note, Drug Amendments of 1962-Generic-
Name Prescribing: Drug Price Panacea?, 16 STAN. L. REV. 649, 650 n. 15 (1964).
25 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970), terms this
the "established name."See alsoTASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at x; Ulrich,
supra note 3, at 142. The generic name for synthetic penicillin is the same as the chemical
name, as identified in note 23 supra. This drug bears the additional generic names of
potassium penicillin 152 and phenethicillin potassium. While the chemical name often
presents problems of communication, it does have the advantage of expressing the rela-
tionship to similar compounds. This relationship is often not expressed in the generic
name, ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note I1, at 223- 24.
26 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at x. Ulrich, supra note 3, at 142. The
trade names for the synthetic penicillin discussed are Syncillin (produced by Bristol),
Darcil (Wyeth), Alpen (Schering), Chemipen (Squibb), Dramcillin-S (White), and Maxipen
(Roerig). Bristol and Wyeth also characterize their brands by the generic name potassium
penicillin 152, while Schering, Squibb, and White also use the ordinary name phenethicillin
potassium for their brands. Roerig uses the generic name alpha-phenoxyethyl penicillin
potassium. ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 11, at 223- 24.
27 As a result of § 112 of the Drug Amendments of 1962, Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 790, amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 502(e), 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1958), and the regulations promulgated under the amend-
ments, 21 C.F.R. § § 1.104, 1.105 (1972), all drugs must now be labeled with the ordinary
as well as trade names. The Drug Amendments of 1962 also give the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare the authority to designate official names. Act of Oct. 10, 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 11, 76 Stat. 780, 789, amending Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1958) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 358 (1970)). For a
discussion of the implications and litigation arising from these amendments, see Sweeny,
The "Generic Every Time" Case: Prescription Drug Industry in Extremis, 21 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 226 (1966): Note, supra note 24; Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1082 (1963).
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drug. 28 This raises the unavoidable factual and technical issue of
whether a given generic drug is equivalent to the particular brand
name pharmaceutical.
Although much of the literature has framed the issue in terms
of generic equivalents, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), in its study of prescription drugs, 29 has rejected
the use of that term.30 In its place, the study employs the terms
chemical equivalent,3l biological equivalent,3 2 and clinical equiv-
alent.33 As to the significant relationships among these terms, the
HEW Task Force on Prescription Drugs has succinctly stated the
problem as follows:
Given two drug products containing essentially the same
amount of the same active ingredient in the same dosage
form-that is, two chemical equivalents-will they produce
essentially the same clinical effects? 3 4
The answer to this question has been debated in the literature and
no concrete answer has emerged.3 5 The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, as the sole unit within HEW with actual knowledge of
manufacturing procedure and drug product quality control assur-
ance, has steadfastly refused to give a generally affirmative or
negative answer, preferring to consider each product on an in-
dividual basis. The HEW Task Force appears to be the first
organization to undertake a systematic study of the clinical equiv-
alency problem. Ideally, any study of the issue should seek to
28 See generally Feldmann, Brand Versus Generic Drugs, NS9 J. AM. PHARMACEUTIC-
AL Assoc.8 (1969).29 The Task Force of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
produced its report in a series of volumes: TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, THE
DRUG USERS (HEW 1968) [hereinafter cited as DRUG USERS]; TASK FORCE ON PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUGS, THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS (HEW 1968) [hereinafter cited as DRUG
PRESCRIBERS]; TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, THE DRUG MAKERS AND THE
DRUG DISTRIBUTORS (HEW 1968); TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17; and
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1.
30 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at x. The Task Force rejected the
shorthand "generic equivalent" for the persuasive reason that its meaning has been
completely confused by the literature.
31 "Chemical equivalents- Those multiple-source drug products which contain essen-
tially identical amounts of the identical active ingredients, in identical dosage forms, and
which meet existing physico-chemical standards in the official compendia." Id.
32 "Biological equivalents-Those chemical equivalents which, when administered in the
same amounts, will provide essentially the same biological or physiological availability, as
measured by blood levels, etc." Id.
33 "Clinical equivalents-Those chemical equivalents which, when administered in the
same amounts, will provide essentially the same therapeutic effect as measured by the
control of a symptom or a disease." Id.
34 Id. at 31.
35 Significant issues of public policy, governmental drug policy, regulation of the drug
industry, drug standards, and drug marketing turn on the answer to this question. DRUG
PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 22.
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determine the relationship between chemical and clinical equiv-
alency. The Task Force decided, however, that this would be
impractical from a testing point of view. 36 Therefore the Task
Force used the premise that a study of the relationship between
chemical equivalents and biological equivalents could serve as a
proxy for a study of the chemical-clinical relationship. 37 This
position has not been found to be acceptable to the agency or to
the Food and Drug Administration. The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration has only recently finished the awesome task of reviewing
all prescription drugs marketed under federal drug laws. In its
review of drug efficacy the agency concluded that each manufac-
turer must submit documentation as to the efficacy of his own
product, regardless of the chemical likeness to others.
In order to assess the relationship of chemical equivalence to
biological equivalence, a number of factors must be considered. 3 8
These factors bearing on physiological availability are substan-
tially influenced by the manner in which the pharmaceutical is
formulated. 39 Beginning in 1967, the Task Force began limited
biological equivalency trials for selected drugs. After approx-
imately one year of testing, the Task Force had concluded that,
"on the basis of available evidence, lack of clinical equivalency
among chemical equivalents meeting all official standards has
36 For the direct determination of clinical equivalency, the ideal method
would be the comparison of two or more drug products, containing the same
active ingredients, in the same tablet or capsule or other dosage form, in the
same amounts, and measurement of their relative effects in human patients in
the alleviation of symptoms or the control of a specific disease.
Except perhaps in rare instances, such a comparison is impractical. It
would be time-consuming and costly. It would be complicated not only by
human differences but by differences in the symptoms or diseases under
consideration. Furthermore, it would involve human experimentation under
conditions in which an unexpected lack of clinical equivalency might well
have serious adverse results.
Id. at 23.3 7 This necessarily assumes that biological equivalency will in most cases correspond
with clinical or therapeutic equivalency. To support this assumption, the Task Force found
that there is
general agreement among pharmacologists that in the case of most
drugs-certainly those taken orally for their effects in the blood, the liver, the
brain, or other internal organs-their therapeutic effectiveness will be sub-
stantially related to the absorption of the active ingredient into the blood
stream. Thus, if two preparations yield the same blood concentration of
active ingredients, they will presumably yield the same therapeutic effect.
id.
3 8 The drug must presentthe required concentration, be released from the dosage form
into residual granules, dissolve within a reasonable period of time, and be absorbed and
delivered to the appropriate part of the body in an adequate concentration. Id.
39 Solubility, particle size, crystal form, tablet compression, additives (adjuvants), and
age of the drug are factors to be considered. Id. at 24. See also NATIONAL PHARMACEU-
TICAL COUNCIL, THE IMPORTANCE OF PHARMACEUTICAL "KNOW-HOW" (n.d.); Sadove,
What is a Generic Equivalent?, AM. PROFESSIONAL PHARMACIST, Feb., 1965, at 23-29.
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been grossly exaggerated as a major hazard to the public
health." 40 Further testing was to be carried out on a high priority
basis. Significantly, at this writing five years later, the results of
this research are not yet available 4' but will hopefully be a com-
prehensive and objective consideration of the problem.
A. Proequivalence Arguments
Those who have advocated that chemical equivalents are often
clinically or therapeutically equivalent have used a number of
arguments to support this proposition. Where chemical equiv-
alents have been used on a wide-scale basis over a long period of
time, these advocates urge that there have been few reports to the
effect that clinical results differ significantly. 42 This has been the
case in a number of foreign health systems which employ limited
forms of substitution in situations where the drugs are arguably
equivalent.43 Similarly, some public sector experience in the
United States has enhanced the argument that clinical nonequiva-
lence is not as serious a concern as has been suggested. 44 Chem-
ical equivalents have been employed in some instances by the
Public Health Service, Veterans' Administration, and the Depart-
ment of Defense procurement services. However, the last, as the
single largest federal purchaser of drugs and devices, has a sub-
stantial number of inspectors who independently monitor the
manufacturers submitting bids. They also independently sample
and test the product before use. These services further have their
own specifications which the product must meet. On the basis of
these specifications and testing, the Department of Defense pro-
curement services reject an average of 40 percent of all bids, even
though the particular product may actually be on the market for
public use.45
The issue of clinical equivalence is of course a concern in the
hospital formulary system where limited substitution has worked
40 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 3 1.
41 After extensive investigations, it appears that no conclusive findings have yet been
reported.42 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 3 1- 32.
4 3 See, e.g., TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, Supra note 17, at 140 (Australia), 143
(Belgium), 146 (Canada), 171 (Denmark), 174 (France), 179 (Great Britain), 183 (Nether-
lands), 186 (New Zealand), 189 (Norway), 192 (Sweden), 196 (West Germany). In a
number of these countries, the use of chemical equivalents has not raised serious questions
regarding the lack of clinical equivalency.
44 See, e.g., TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 3 1-32; TASK FORCE CUR-
RENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 3- 134.
45See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 1-32; TASK FORCE CURRENT
PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 4, 18- 19.
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successfully. 46 Risk-taking in a hospital population is minimized,
however, by constant patient contact with nurses and clinical
pharmacists as well as physician supervision. Therefore, the com-
parability of this system with nonhospital situations is far less
than perfect. Those who suggest that clinical equivalence of
chemical equivalents is a common occurrence nevertheless point
to these systems employing substitution to demonstrate that the
organizations using these systems are satisfied that equivalence
does occur.
It is often pointed out that all drugs approved to be marketed in
the United States must meet the requirements of the national drug
compendia such as the United States Pharmacopeia and the
National Formulary.47 This argument is not entirely accurate. A
manufacturer of a given product may send it to market without
running any compendial tests. It is only when the manufacturer is
involved in an enforcement proceeding that government agencies
check whether these requirements have been complied with. The
assertion of this argument, however, is that once a product has
met the compendial standards of chemical equivalence, substan-
tial therapeutic equivalence must follow. 4 One must bear in mind,
however, that the compendia do not advise as to manufacture, but
simply offer minimal quality-control monographs. In using the
compendial designations on his product, the manufacturer is only
agreeing that if and when his product is tested, it will meet these
minimal criteria. Yet because in actuality his product is rarely
sampled and tested, the Task Force has found that compliance
with compendial standards may not be sufficient. 49 Some exam-
ples of nonequivalence have been reported. Most recently, gov-
ernment analysts have been dismayed by the lack of clinical
efficacy and bioavailability of various brands of Digitoxin which
all presumably met the compendial standards for this cardiac
maintenance product. Authorities affiliated with the compendia
state that these instances are few in number and the answer to the
problem lies in more rigid specifications. It is asserted that the
problem should be approached with a view to finding standards to
46 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
47 UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION, INC. ET AL., UNITED STATES
PHARMACOPEIA (18th ed. 1970); AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION ET AL.,
NATIONAL FORMULARY (13th ed. 1970). Both compendia are long established and have
received "official" status under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 50 1(b), 21
U.S.C. §351(b) (1970). A summary of standards used may be found in DRUG PRE-
SCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 25- 26.
48 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 34.
49 "The existing standards do not provide complete assurance of clinical or biological
equivalency." DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 26.
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identify those drugs which are not equivalent. 50 Regrettably, these
are after-the-fact detection procedures which ensue following a
notice of complaint or drug failure. Public safety demands a better
inspection system to deter more forcefully manufacturer uncon-
scionability.
B. Antiequivalence Arguments
Those who suggest that the relationship between chemical
equivalents and clinical equivalents is tenuous and at this time
largely unknown raise several arguments. 51 Not all chemicals
which are substantially equivalent produce identical clinical re-
sults. The use of therapeutically nonequivalent products would
thus jeopardize the quality of health care in general as well as in
specific cases. There are a number of well-documented examples
which have shown that with generic equivalents, the same clinical
results were not obtained.5 2 The number of such examples has
been variously rated from five to over 2003. This demonstrated
lack of correspondence between chemical and therapeutic equiv-
alents results from a number of technical factors which are not
reflected in purely chemical terms.54 As an example, this author
was recently shown an antibiotic sample rejected by the Federal
Defense Procurement Agency which had passed certification on
an in vitro basis but when tested in vivo by their bacteriologists
exhibited zero efficacy.
Consideration of the problem in terms of mere nonequivalence
perhaps understates the problem. It has been suggested that the
problem should be seen in terms of demonstrably equivalent drugs
rather than demonstrably nonequivalent pharmaceuticals. Propo-
nents of nonequivalence argue that it is a matter of burden of
proof and that it should not be assumed that different pharmaceu-
tical products are equivalent simply because they have not been
demonstrated to be nonequivalent. 55
Antisubstitution groups also assert that brand name manufac-
turers have more efficient and reliable quality control than other
50 Id. at 26-27; TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 34.
51 See generally Sadove, Generic Equivalents: The Problem-The Truth, 15 THE NEW
PHYSICIAN 257 (1966); J. WAGNER, BIOPHARMACEUTICS AND RELEVANT PHARMACOKIN-
ETICS (1971); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WHITE PAPER ON THE THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE OF CHEMICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS (n.d.).52See, e.g., DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 27.
5 31d.
54See Sadove, supra note 39, at 29; Prescott & Nimmo, Generic Inequivalency-
Clinical Observations, 3 ACTA PHARMACOLOGICIA ET TOXICOLOGICA 288 (1971); NA-
TIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COUNCIL, supra note 39.
55 DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 27.
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manufacturers. They also maintain that brand name manufac-
turers have often exceeded the standards of the official com-
pendia, and as a result their product should not be equated with
those products which only meet the minimum criteria of formula-
tion and manufacture.5 6
C. Additional Comment:
The HEW Task Force Report
In concluding that the dangers of clinical nonequivalency were
exaggerated, 57 the HEW Task Force made several findings. First,
while the problem of nonequivalence does not even arise for most
pharmaceuticals and although the number of reported examples of
clinical nonequivalency is small, such examples cannot be ig-
nored. Second, because 80 percent of the widely used prescription
drugs are under patent for seventeen years or enjoy licensure by
the Food and Drug Administration, they cannot be legally dupli-
cated. Third, for the remaining one-fifth of the popular pre-
scription drugs, exact clinical equivalency is not crucially impor-
tant. Those few where exact clinical equivalence is of great impor-
tance should be studied carefully in this context. Fourth, none-
quivalency may be more widespread than reported. Fifth, al-
though some chemical equivalents are not therapeutically equiv-
alent, there may be therapeutic value in each of the different
compounds. Sixth, consideration should be given to raising the
standards of the official compendia where lack of clinical equiva-
lence has been shown. Seventh, some chemical equivalents may
produce different side effects 8
Although the technical answer to the problem of clinical
equivalence is by no means clear, it is fair to say that at least in
some instances, commodities which are chemically identical will
produce therapeutic results which are not significantly different.
All chemical equivalents are certainly not equivalent in the clini-
cal sense; furthermore the number of nonequivalents is probably
sufficiently great that we cannot ignore the problem. Among drugs
in common use, however, it is almost certain that a significant
number of clinical equivalents exist, even if the effort has not yet
been made to document that fact. It is in these situations that
substitution may be a procedure which the law may seek to allow
or to encourage.
56 See id.; Sadove, supra note 39, at 25.
57 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
5 8 DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 27-28.
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III. THE SUBSTITUTION DEBATE
The discussion of whether substitution should be a permissible
practice operates within two constraints. First, the issue of substi-
tution arises only in those instances where the prescriber has a
choice of at least two equivalent products. In a large number of
instances, not only is the brand name protected by trademark, but
the underlying chemical composition is protected by a patent 59
Of the most frequently used prescription drugs, 80 percent are
covered by a patent. The HEW Task Force's Master Drug List
included the 409 drugs most frequently used by elderly people. 60
Of these, almost 300 were protected by a patent and produced by
only one manufacturer. 6 1 For these pharmaceuticals, the issue of
substitution was not present. In the remaining 116, however, the
drug was available under generic or brand names from more than
one supplier. 2 Notwithstanding the fact that the Food and Drug
Administration requires separate proof of safety and efficacy for
each one individually, it is for these drugs that substitution is both
a legal and practical issue. Second, it can be reasonbly argued that
substitution should be permissible only where the two or more
products from which a prescriber can choose are therapeutically
equivalent. The only body with expertise sufficient to warrant this
is the Federal Food and Drug Administration, and they are
presently unprepared to undertake the task, let alone the war-
ranty. At the same time, clinical proof of acceptability is virtually
the exclusive purview of the medical profession. To argue that a
nonequivalent product should be permitted to be substituted
would be to defeat the goal of rational prescribing. 63
A. Prosubstitution Arguments
The most often heard and perhaps most persuasive argument in
favor of substitution in cases of substantial therapeutic equiva-
lence is cost. The decision to prescribe an appropriate drug should
include economic as well as scientific considerations. One of the
constituent elements of rational prescribing is a consideration of
relative costs. 64 Foremost among factors contributing to the fail-
56 For an analysis of the roles played by patents in the drug industry, see ADMINISTERED
DRUG PRICES, supra note I1, at 105-54.
60 DRUG USERS, supra note 29, at 36.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 "Rational prescribing-Prescribing the right drug for the right patient. at the right
time, in the right amounts, and with due consideration of relative costs." TASK FORCE
FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at x.
r For a definition of rational prescribing, see id. That cost is a factor which should be
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ure to consider costs when prescribing is the fact that "[h]e who
orders does not buy; and he who buys does not order." 65 In
essence, the consumer must buy and the pharmacist must dis-
pense only what the physician has prescribed. Because this
unique relationship exists, the drug manufacturers aim their ad-
vertising at the physician rather than at the ultimate consumer.66
Furthermore, the large manufacturers spend a considerable
amount of money in order to distinguish their products from other
brand names. 6 7 Much of this promotional expense is aimed at
maximizing the use of brand names and minimizing the use of
generic names.68 It is generally admitted that the overall market
for d-ugs is fixed in the sense that the demand for all drugs
considered together cannot be significantly increased as it can be
with other commodities.6 9 Nevertheless, it would seem evident
that the real purpose of these promotional expenses is to main-
tain or to enhance market position for particular brand names
vis-A-vis competitors. 70 Arguably, this amount of promotional ex-
pense is excessive and adds unduly to the price of prescription
drugs. 71 For large manufacturers, approximately 24 percent of the
sales dollar goes to advertising expenses, 13 percent to profit, and
13 percent to taxes. 72 However, scaled into the drug pricing
considered in prescribing is well recognized. DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 29, at 4;
Goodman, The Problem of Drug Efficacy: An Exercise in Dissection, in P. TALALAY,
DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 53 (1964).
6 Statement of Seymour Blackman, cited in E. KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: Mo-
NOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA 18 (1965); See also TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note
21, at 12. In 1959 and 1960 Senator Kefauver's Subcommittee on Monopoly and Antitrust
held hearings on "administered prices." One target of his investigation was the drug
industry. His findings are summarized in ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 11.
Senator Kefauver condensed these voluminous hearings in a book, which in part considers
the drug industry. E. KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA
8-79 (1965).
6 6 ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 1I, at 155.6 7The Kefauver Committee estimated that the drug industry spent $750 million in 1958
for promotional expenses. For the twenty-two largest manufacturers, this represented 24
percent of the price of goods sold. Id. at 157.6 8 Id. at 231-34.
69 One industry spokesman, Francis C. Brown of the Schering Corporation, has summa-
rized the problem in the following fashion: "Senator .... we can't put two sick people in
every bed when there is only one person sick." Hearings on S. Res. 57 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
Ist & 2d Sess., pt. 14 at 7888 (1959-60) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Senator
Kefauver's investigations were continued by Senator Nelson. See Hearings on Com-
petitive Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 91st Cong., I st & 2d Sess.
(1967-70).70 See E. Kafauver, supra note 65, at I 1-22.
71 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, pt. 14, at 8205 (remarks of Mr. Blackman).
72 ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note 11, at 157. For a comprehensive analysis of
the American and Canadian drug industries, see Steele, An Economic Analysis of Recent
Attempts to Alter the Laws Regulating the Prescription Drug Industry: The Canadian
Investigation and Its Relevance for the United States, 6 HOUSTON L. REV. 666 (1969).
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structure are the costs of research and innovation, the losses for
maintaining on the market drugs w hich are vital for rare condi-
tions (but infrequently sold), products liability insurance, and the
like.
In contrast to brand name drugs, many chemically equivalent
preparations are therefore understandably available at lower costs
than their brand name counterparts. 73 Extensive documentation is
offered to illustrate the savings gained by the public from either
substitution of chemical equivalents or prescribing on a generic
name basis. For sixty-three drugs on HEW's Master Drug List,
the HEW Task Force found that a change to generic prescribing
would save 55 percent at the wholesale level and from 20 to 35
percent at the retail level, depending on the pharmacist's mark-
up. 74 This corresponds with an annual savings at the retail level of
from 30 to 40 million dollars on total annual expenditures by the
public of 150 million dollars for these sixty-three pharmaceutic-
als. 75 Total annual expenditures by the public on all prescription
drugs were reported to be 2.3 billion dollars in 1966.76 Even if the
highest standards of health care would permit substitution in only
a fraction of all transactions, the savings to the public would be
significant. The precise amount to be saved has, of course, been
debated, 77 and the more extreme situations of price differentials
have been indicated. 78 Although these wide variations are not
always present, the HEW Task Force concluded that important
savings could be realized, even though the amount was uncer-
tain. 79 The advocates of generic drugs argue that the consumer
73 The HEW Task Force found that of the approximately 400 drugs on its Master Drug
List, sixty-three could be obtained at "a cost distinctly lower than that of the brand-name
product." TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 36. Twenty-three drugs could
only be obtained at the same or a higher cost. Id.
74 Id. By implication the same savings would result if substitution were permitted in
these instances.7 5This represents a savings of 6 to 8 percent on the total spending for the 400 drugs on
the Master Drug List, which spending came to more than 600 million dollars at the time of
the HEW Task Force Study. Id.
76 DRUG USERS, supra 29, at 19.
77 See, e.g., TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 36- 37.
78 For example, Meticorten ($8.50 per 30) is available under the generic name pre-
dnisone ($2.58 per 30); Serpasil ($7.06 per 100) is available under the name reserpine
($2.91 per 100). TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 36. In 1961 McKesson &
Robbins sold prednisone by generic name for approximately $3.00 per 100 (retail price).
At the same time Schering sold its brand name for almost $30 per 100 (retail price). E.
KEFAUVER, supra note 65, at 12. In the case of dextroamphetamine, the difference in price
can be as much as a factor of twenty. E. KEFAUVER, supra note 65, at 18. In a competitive
bidding situation, as where the Defense Medical Supply Center buys generically, the
manufacturers have offered lower prices. Id. at 20- 23.
7 Specifically, the Task Force said:
The Task Force finds, therefore, that the use of low-cost chemical equiva-
lents can yield important savings, especially in the case of patients with
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should benefit from savings gained from the substitution of gener-
ic drugs. These savings would reflect lower research costs,80
lower promotional costs, 81 and lower profits among manufacturers
of equivalents. 2
Another factor to be considered is the success produced by the
systems which have used some form of generic prescribing or
generic substitution. There have been relatively few reported
difficulties in both foreign programs83 and federally operated sys-
tems in this country. 84
A number of states have also employed various systems under
combined federal and state programs such as Medicaid. 85 Substi-
tution by prior consent has also been very successful in hospitals
using the formulary system.8 6 The latter does not necessarily
require use of less expensive drugs. Often the hospital stocks one
of many well-regarded brands and that is the extent of their
substitution, while they save on volume purchases and reduced
inventory.
Another reason that has weighed at various times in favor of
substitution in cases of equivalence has been the rapidly in-
creasing number of drugs on the market. In previous years 300 to
500 new brand names flooded the market every year.87 Although
within the past two years some decline has occurred, it has
become increasingly difficult for doctors to familiarize themselves
with these products.88 Moreover, most physicians learn pharma-
cardiovascular disease, kidney disease, arthritis, and mental and nervous
conditions, and the use of such products should be encouraged wherever this
is consistent with high-quality health care.
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 37.
80 The HEW Task Force found that much of the funds spent by the large manufacturers
on research "provide only minor contributions to medical progress," since only 10 to 25
percent of new drugs every year represent new chemicals. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2 1, at 8.
81 See text accompanying notes 66-72, supra. See also TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 2 1, at 9.
82 The Task Force found that the drug industry was characterized by an "exceptionally
high rate of profit... [which] is not accompanied by any peculiar degree of risk." TASK
FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 14. The twenty-two largest manufacturers of
drugs net an average 13 percent profit after taxes. ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra
note II, at 157. Testimony before Senator Kefauver's Subcommittee indicated that it is
these high profits which make the drug industry "Wall Street's 'fair-haired boy.' " Senate
Hearings, supra note 69, pt. 14, at 8205.
83 See generally TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 136-205.
84See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 38-39; TASK FORCE CURRENT
PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 2-31.
s5See TASK FORCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 32- 134; see also TASK
FORCE FINAL REPORT,supra note 21, at 44-45 for projected savings from using chemical
equivalents in these programs.
86TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 39-40. See also, ADMINISTERED
DRUG PRICES, supra note 11, at 238-44.
87 ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note II, at 225.
88 Id. at 225- 26.
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cology in medical schools on the basis of generic names.89 In light
of these factors, it may make more sense for physicians to pre-
scribe generically or permit substitution by the pharmacist of
generically equivalent drugs.
Finally, the lower priced generic equivalents must meet the
same chemical standards of the national compendia required of
the brand names when tested.90 Thus the use of proven generic
equivalents where possible does not subject the patient to inferior
care. Furthermore, the majority of drug manufacturers, both large
and small, whether producing brand or generic name pharmaceu-
ticals, use proper methods to insure a high quality product?1
Recalls for substandard drugs have involved not only the smaller
manufacturers but all types of producers.92 Furthermore, it is
claimed that the boast of the brand name manufacturers that their
products exceed the necessary standards may be largely irrele-
vant.93
To summarize, the advocates of substitution argue that where
every reasonable assurance can be given that two pharmaceuticals
are equivalent, relative cost should be the determinative factor.
With appropriate regulations and a thorough up-to-date generic
compendium the pharmacist would be in a proper position to
decide this issue. To permit substitution of an equivalent phar-
maceutical under such conditions, groups such as the American
Pharmaceutical Association have argued, would reduce the cost
of equivalent health care without jeopardizing the quality of treat-
ment received by the patient.94
B. Antisubstitution Arguments
The primary argument of those who oppose substitution where
drugs are equivalent centers around the quality of the pharmaceu-
tical product. 95 They contend that in meeting compendial stan-
99 Id. at 226.
9 0 The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 501(b), 21 U.S.C. §351(b) (1970)
applies to all drugs whether brand name or generic.
91 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 9. The HEW Task Force reported that
the cost of an adequate quality control system was 2.4 percent of sales for large firms and
somewhat less for the smaller companies.
92 Id.
93 ADMINISTERED DRUG PRICES, supra note II, at 23 1.94 See generally AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, THE PHARMACIST'S ROLE
IN PRODUCT SELECTION (1971); Academy of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Critique and
Response, NS12 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL AssoC. 225 (!972). For the physicians' re-
sponse to the proposals of the substitution advocates, see Hunter, The Pharmacist's Role
in Drug Product Selection-A Survey of Physician's Attitudes in Washtenaw County,
MICH. PHARMACIST, Aug., 1971, at 30.
95 0n the issue of drug quality, see generally Perloff, Anti-Substitution Law Repeal-Pro
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dards, manufacturers of generic name drugs exercise little quality
control. One set of data often cited 96 pertains to the relative rates
of regulatory confiscation between the major manufacturers and
the smaller producers, who tend to produce only generic drugs.
From 1950 to 1960, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
examined approximately 8,000 drug samples which represented
the output of the twenty-eight firms producing almost 90 percent
of the prescription drugs sold in the United States. A total of four
legal actions against these firms was instituted during this period.
In contrast, the FDA also examined over 8,000 samples from the
1,200 other firms in the industry. Among these firms, the agency
instituted almost 500 actions for violations by 235 fii-ms. These
statistics are employed to support the proposition that "the likeli-
hood of legal action resulting from composition violations is over
100 times greater if the drugs are manufactured by the smaller
companies, which includes all the 'generic houses.' ',97 This great-
er likelihood is presumably a result of the lower levels of stan-
dards and quality control in the generic houses. Thus, it is argued,
when a physician's order for a brand name is the object of substi-
tution and the patient receives a less expensive brand or generic
name, the probability that the patient will be subjected to a less
effective and possibly a harmful drug is greatly increased.
Another concern is the relationship among the physician, the
pharmacist, and the patient. Not infrequently, a physician will
prescribe a particular brand name on the grounds that it has a
special feature which other products which are chemically equiv-
alent do not have. To permit substitution in this context deprives
the physician of his ability to prescribe a drug which he feels is
necessary for its unique qualities. In effect, to permit the phar-
macist to substitute another drug upon a consideration of costs
measureably decreases the certainty of therapeutic effect that the
physician seeks. Undoubtedly, physicians are hesitant to delegate
their professional responsibility in this fashion; in some instances
this feeling may be well founded on technical considerations.
The prescribing physician has the duty to decide whether the
patient's health and well-being will be affected adversely by a
particular product; he therefore must consider whether a product
is compounded with ample quality control. He further must con-
sider factors bearing on the bioequivalence of the product he
and Con: The Case Against Repeal, 67 PHILA. MEDICINE 83 (1971); ACADEMY OF
PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES, DRUG PRODUCT QUALITY (1969); Edwards, The FDA's
Views on Generic Equivalence and Drug Quality, PHARMACY TIMES, June, 1970, at 46.
9 6Senate Hearings, supra note 69, pt. 22, at 12114, 12147.
9 7 UIrich, supra note 3, at 148.
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selects. Arguably, a pharmacist simply does not have the exper-
tise to consider those factors which may interfere with any corre-
spondence between chemical and therapeutic equivalence. 98 The
pharmacist is not able to analyze the reliability or reputation of
the manufacturer as is the physician. Since the pharmacist is
neither trained to prescribe nor allowed to render his own pre-
scription, he should not be able to overrule the physician's
choice. 99 Quite clearly the ordinary patient lacks the knowledge to
appreciate the subtle differences among pharmaceuticals. As a
result, the patient is not prepared to give a knowledgeable and
voluntary consent to the substitution of a different product.
The administrative costs to be incurred in establishing a system
of substitution are substantial. It is estimated that a system for
substitution could not be effective until at least two years after
legislation is approved. 100 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
any administrative or legislative system would be able to insure
that substitution would be permitted only in cases of therapeutic
identity. Because very few valid clinical trials have been carried
out, it is not clear that a sufficient number of identical drugs would
be found to justify the extensive expense involved. Those who
oppose substitution tend to doubt that there are a great number of
these truly therapeutically equivalent drugs and believe that
equivalence should be well demonstrated before any substitution
is permitted.101
The number of organizations that have opposed substitution
initiated by the pharmacist or coerced generic prescribing is in-
deed formidable.10 2 They argue that the evidence available in-
dicates that substitution in general is inconsistent with superior
health care. And, admittedly, where substitution or generic pre-
scribing is detrimental to the health or well-being of the patient,
this practice cannot be permitted or encouraged.
IV. STATE OF THE LAW: PHARMACIST'S LIABILITY
Under present law the pharmacist who supplies a patient with a
therapeutic equivalent to the brand name prescribed by the physi-
cian is confronted by a variety of liabilities. He may be subject to
administrative, criminal, and civil sanctions, regardless of the fact
98 Galbally, supra note I, at 764.
9 Ulrich, supra note 3, at 141-42.
100 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 44.
101 See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
102See, e.g., Editorial: Drug Names, 190 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 542 (1964); Fishbein,
Editorial: Generic Names, 33 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 524 (1963).
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that the substituted drug is therapeutically equivalent to the pre-
scribed drug. Furthermore, the practicing pharmacist is regulated
by both the federal and state governments.
A. State Administrative Liabilities
Because the practice of pharmacy bears directly upon the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare, the field is within the scope of the
state's police power.103 The common pattern of state regulation
requires that professional pharmacists be licensed. 10 4 The licens-
ing requirements usually pertain to professional education and
experience, as well as satisfactory performance on an examination
and evidence of good character. 10 5 A pharmacy typically cannot
do business without the direct supervision of a licensed pharmac-
ist.1O6 Violations of the prohibitions against substitution can lead
to various actions by the state board of pharmacy against the
pharmacist. A fine may be assessed, 10 7 and under some circum-
stances the pharmacist's license to practice may be suspended or
revoked. 10 8 Because this sanction is often imposed by an adminis-
trative proceeding before the state board of pharmacy, the nature
of the practice in question and the action taken by the board are
frequently not disclosed to the general public.
A threshold problem in the administrative regulation of
pharmacy is the difficulty of discovering when substitution has
occurred. Discovery in the nonprescription context requires only
that the vendee learn that he has not received the ordered item.
Where the buyer has presented the pharmacist with a pre-
scription, however, it is highly unlikely that the purchaser will
recognize that he has received something other than that which
the physician has prescribed, unless he has an abnormal reaction
to the substituted drug. In the majority of cases, neither the
patient nor the physician will suspect that substitution has oc-
curred. The pharmacist may have dispensed an item which pur-
ports to be of the same composition as the prescribed item and is
103 See, e.g., Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E. 2d
504 (1965); State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 197 N.Y. 353, 90 N.E. 966 (1910).
104 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1107 (Supp. 1972), amending MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1107 (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6805 (McKinney 1972).
105 See statutes cited in note 104 supra.
106See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §338.1114 (Supp. 1972), amending, MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1114 (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6808(3)(e) (McKinney 1972).
107 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6809 (McKinney 1972).
108See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, §266A (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§338.1115 (Supp. 1972), amending MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1115 (1967); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § (McKinney 1972);PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 390-5 (1968).
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identically colored and shaped. 109 If the substituted drug is equiv-
alent to the dispensed drug in some fashion, the only discernible
therapeutic differences may be in potency, in rate of achievement
of blood levels, or in dissolution times and disintegration rates.
Generally, only a truly unskillful job of substitution will trigger
suspicion. As a result, the task of discovery falls on experts such
as physicians, pharmacologists, and other pharmacists, 10 oper-
ating in conjunction with trained law enforcement personnel.'"
Moreover, the problem in discovering cases where substitution
has occurred arises not only in the administrative context but also
where a buyer seeks a judicial remedy against a pharmacist.
Administrative agencies may discover the substituting phar-
macist by other means as well. An inspection of a pharmacist's
inventory may reveal to officials that a pharmacist is engaging in
substitution. The presence in inventory of large amounts of chem-
ically equivalent products which physically resemble popular and
quick-moving brand names will often raise suspicion. In such a
case investigators will typically have the pharmacist fill decoy
prescriptions for a brand name and then subject the drug to
chemical analysis. If testing reveals that the prescription was in
fact the subject of substitution, appropriate administrative or
criminal proceedings will be instituted.
B. Criminal and Other Governmentally
Initiated Actions
I. Under State Law-The pharmacist who intentionally or
negligently dispenses a prescription drug other than the item or-
dered faces criminal penalties on at least two different legal bases:
substitution per se and misbranding. A number of states speci-
fically define substitution to include brand name substitution." 2
Typically such substitution constitutes a criminal offense" 3 con-
viction of which may result in a jail sentence." 4 Statutes usually
109 See, e.g., Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Weinberg, 60 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1932).
110 Statutes often provide for the services of trained personnel to aid in discovery. See,
e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6804 (McKinney 1972).
"' See, e.g., Ulrich, supra note 3, at 143-44, for a discussion of the means used to
discover substitution and other irregularities, in a scheme to defraud the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Public Welfare.
12 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1101 (1967). The relevant portion of the
statute is set out in note 9 supra. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §45:14-16 (1963); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6816 (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 390-5(8)(1968).
113 See, e.g.,MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1117(I) (1967); N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 6816
(McKinney 1972).
114 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6816 (McKinney 1972).
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empower the state board of pharmacy to refer cases to the appro-
priate prosecuting attorney or attorney general.1 1 5
In most states, the substituting pharmacist confronts criminal
liabilities under the state misbranding 16 or adulterating 117 stat-
utes. In states which proscribe substitution per se, liability for
misbranding is in addition to liability for substitution.1 1 8 Viola-
tions for misbranding or adulteration will typically occur where
the physician has prescribed a particular brand and the pharmacist
dispenses a different brand while labeling the container with the
elements of the original prescription. As with substitution, a viola-
tion of the misbranding or adulteration statutes can result in a fine
or jail sentence 1 9 as well as the administrative actions previously
discussed. 120
In addition to administrative and criminal liabilities, the substi-
tuting pharmacist may be subject to other governmentally initiated
action. Drugs which have been misbranded or adulterated may be
subject to seizure by the state. 121 The pharmacist may further be
subject to an injunction to prevent introduction of misbranded or
adulterated items into commerce.1 22
2. Under Federal Law- Violations of federal law may be con-
current with violations of state law. The Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act 23 includes no definition of substitution. 124 The
federal statute includes substitution within the definition of mis-
branding. The Act prohibits the misbranding or adulteration of
any drug moved by interstate commerce 125 and the delivery of
such drug through the means of interstate commerce.' 26 Violation
115 See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1125 (1967).
116 E.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 335.1, 335.4, 335.10 (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§§ 6811(10), 6815(2)(h) (McKinney 1972);PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-4(b), 780-4(c),
780- 14 (1964). It should be noted that the offense of misbranding is often included in the
state food and drug act (which applies to others as well as pharmacists), while substitution
is usually defined in the state code which regulates professional pharmacists.117 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 335.1, 335.3, 338.1117(1) (1967); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW §§6802(13), 6811(11), 6815(l) (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 780-4(b), 780(c), 780-13 (1964).
118 Compare Michigan statutes cited in notes 112 and 113 supra, with Michigan statutes
cited in note 116 supra.
119 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1117(m) (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§6811, 6816
(McKinney 1972);PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- 20 (1964).
120 See text accompanying notes 107- 108 supra.
121 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §6813 (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-12
(1964).
122 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §338,1127 (1967); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §6824
(McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- 21 (1964).
123 21 U.S.C. § § 301-392 (1970).
124 This may be attributable to the fact that the Act does not aim to regulate the
pharmacist himself, this aspect being largely a matter of state concern.
125 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §301(b), 21 U.S.C. § 33 1(b) (1970).
2 2 6 d. § 301(c), 21 U.S.C. § 331(c) (1970).
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of these provisions can result in fine or imprisonment. 27 Where
the pharmacist labels a substituted drug with a prescription label
meant by the prescriber to cover the actual product he prescribed,
the pharmacist is labeling in a false or misleading manner in
violation of the Act.128 He is also dispensing an imitation and
offering a drug for sale under the name of another drug in viola-
tion of the Federal Act.129 Although the Act exempts the phar-
macist from some of the labeling requirements,13 0 it specifically
does not exempt pharmacists from those labeling requirements
noted above.' 31 Because virtually all prescription drugs with
which the pharmacist deals have traveled through interstate com-
merce, a pharmacist is exceedingly likely to be subject to the
Act.'3 2 The statute further provides that any drug which must be
used under the supervision of a medical practitioner may only be
dispensed upon the prescription of a physician.133 Dispensing a
drug contrary to this provision is an act which "results in the drug
being misbranded while held for sale. ' 13 4 A pharmacist who dis-
penses an item different from that prescribed may violate this
section because he has dispensed a drug without a prescription for
that drug.
Violations of these federal provisions may result in other ac-
tions in addition to criminal penalties. As under state law, the
drugs are subject to seizure if they are determined to be mis-
branded under federal law.' 35 The pharmacist may also be subject
to an injunction under the Act.'36
C. Civil Liabilities
Where a pharmacist dispenses a drug other than that called for
in the prescription and the patient suffers injury as a proximate
result of this substitution, the pharmacist may be held liable in a
civil action for damages. 3 7 The most prominent theory used
1
27 1d. § 303.21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
128 Id. § 502(a), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970).
129 Id. § 502(i), 21 U.S.C. § 352(i) (1970).
130 1d. §503(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. §353(b)(2) (1970) exempts the pharmacist from some
requirements of§ 502 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. §352 (1970).
131 Id. § 503(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (1970).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
133 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b)(1)(c), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(c)
(1970).134 Id.
13 Id. § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
:
36 1d. § 302, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. I, 1971).
137 For a comprehensive survey of the pharmacist's civil liabilities see Kamm, The
Liability of the Pharmacist in the Role of Drug Product Selector, ILL. PHARMACIST, Jan.,
1971, at 19- 22.
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against the substituting practitioner is negligence. The typical case
involves the situation where the pharmacist erroneously substi-
tutes a harmful or ineffective item for the one prescribed.' 3 8
Because a patient entrusts his life and health to the skill and
judgment of the pharmacist, the pharmacist is held to the highest
standard of caution and care.139 This exceptional duty of care
applies in the dispensing of both nonprescription 140 and pre-
scription items. 14 ' It is clearly a breach of this duty where the
pharmacist erroneously supplies a drug different from that pre-
scribed or ordered, and he will be held liable for any damages
incurred as a result of this breach.142
The pharmacist may also be held liable on a warranty theory. It
has been stated that "a druggist who sells a prescription warrants
that... he will compound the drug prescribed.' 143 Moreover,
"the written order or prescription [is] the basis of the bargain."' 4 4
If the pharmacist either intentionally or negligently substitutes
another drug for the prescribed one, he will have breached this
warranty and be liable for consequent injuries. 14 5 Although this
warranty is characterized as implied, the pharmacist may addi-
tionally give express warranties on which he may be held liable,
as where the compound dispensed is represented to have certain
qualities. 146 Injured parties have not frequently used warranty
theory as a basis for their claims. 147
An alternative basis for the pharmacist's liability for damages
resulting from substitution is that violations of drug and pharmacy
138 See, e.g., Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances Seraph, 375 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1967);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Duensing v. Huscher, 431 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1968).
139 Krueger v. Knutson, 261 Minn. 144, 152, 11I N.W.2d 526, 532 (1961).
140 See, e.g., id.
141 See, e.g., People's Service Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sommerville, 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12
(1932); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), motion for leave to
appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (197 1).
142 See Potter v. Krown Drugs, 214 So. 2d 198 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Brown v. Marshall,
47 Mich. 576, II N.W. 392 (1882); MacKay v. Crown Drug Co., 420 P.2d 883 (Okla.
1966); Highland Pharmacy v. White, 144 Va. 106, 131 S.E. 198 (1926).
143 McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1965).
144Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 762, 159 S.E.2d 171, 173
(1967).
'4See, e.g., Watkins v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 48 Ga. App. 38, 171 S.E. 830 (1933);
Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 38 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978 (1934); Jones v. George, 56 Tex.
149 (1882); Highland Pharmacy v. White, 144 Va. 106, 131 S.E. 830 (1926).
146See, e.g., Jacobs Pharmacy v. Gipson, 116 Ga' App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967);
Andreopalla v. Gaeta, 260 Mass. 105, 156 N.E. 731 (1927); Patrick v. Carrier-Stevens
Co., 358 Mich. 94, 99 N.W.2d 518 (1959). Intentional substitution in this context may be
found to be fraud as well as a breach of warranty.
147 Additionally it has been reported that research done by legal counsel for the Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Association has revealed no reported cases seeking to hold a pharmac-
ist liable for intentional substitution. Hawkins, Drug Product Selection-The Pharmacist's
Responsibility, MICH. PHARMACIST, Aug., 197 1, at 16.
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laws are tortious per se. In Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eut-
sler,148 plaintiff sought to hold the manufacturer of a surgical nail
liable for injuries that resulted from the misbranding of the device.
Plaintiff established that the misbranding was a violation of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and sought to have the
violation held to be negligence per se. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial judge's instruction that a viola-
tion of the Federal Act was negligence per se in Virginia. 149
Similar reasoning could be applied to the pharmacist who has
misbranded a drug with resulting injury. Often the pharmacist will
have violated both state and federal law by his substitution, and if
the Eutsler rationale were followed, these violations would be
sufficient to construct a prima facie case.150
Thus the pharmacist who substitutes an equivalent for the
prescribed drug always faces the possibility of a civil suit by an
injured patient. In reality, however, intentional substitution has
not generated much case law. The case law on point has largely
evolved from suits charging egregious negligence in filling a pre-
scription. 15' That intentional substitution has not often been liti-
gated may be a result of several factors. First, the difficulty of
discovering the act is great where the prescribed and dispensed
items are substantially equivalent. Second, because many acts of
intentional substitution involve substantially equivalent products,
it is unlikely that damages will be discernible to anyone but a
physician. Finally, the matter may be dealt with in most cases on
the administrative level where unreported sanctions take the form
of warnings or license suspensions. Even if civil liability does not
usually fall on the substituter, it does play an important part in the
pharmacist's view of the problem. 1 52
V. MODES OF REFORM
Present substitution laws provide a field which is appropriate
for review. 153 Reform requires assurance that the valid concerns
148 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960).
149 276 F.2d at 46 1.
150 But Eutsler may be distinguishable from a substitution case because a patient prob-
ably does not rely on the label in deciding to use a drug in the same sense that the surgeon
relied on the label in Eutsler. The patient relies on the skill of the pharmacist.
151 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 138, 141, and 142 supra.
152 See Willig, Ethical and Legal Implications of Drug Substitution, 23 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 284, 295 (1968). The pharmacist may also face trademark liability to the
manufacturer of the prescribed drug, as where the substituted drug is labeled with the
name of the prescribed item. See, e.g., Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Weinberg, 60 F.2d 461
(3d Cir. 1932).
153 See, e.g., AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, THE PHARMACIST'S ROLE IN
PRODUCT SELECTION (197 1).
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expressed by the parties to the debate' 54 are considered and met.
Any modification of the law must then operate within constraints.
First, substitution should only be permissible where there is evi-
dence to indicate that the products from which the pharmacist
may select are therapeutically equivalent. Second, the pharmacist
must be given a reliable means by which he can determine that
products are therapeutically equivalent. Third, steps must be tak-
en to assure that all drugs which would be used in a substitution
system meet the highest standards of composition, as guaranteed
by effective quality-control systems. Fourth, a system allowing
substitution would probably require a means whereby the physi-
cian could indicate that no substitutions should be made because
of peculiarities in individual cases of which the pharmacist may be
unaware. Fifth, any reform must avoid placing the pharmacist in a
position in which his actions, although complying with state law,
violate federal law, or vice versa. Sixth, new means must be
provided for allocating the infrequent, yet inevitable, losses which
will be generated by a substitution system. These and perhaps
other considerations must be accounted for if substitution is to be
consistent with superior health care.
Recent legislation in Kentucky 155 establishing a system per-
mitting substitution deserves consideration to determine the ex-
tent to which the legislation meets the concerns noted above. The
Kentucky act establishes a nine-member Drug Formulary Council
consisting of representatives of the medical and pharmacy profes-
sions, the public, and the state government. 156 The Council is
directed to prepare a formulary "of drugs and pharmaceuticals
with their generic or chemical names, if any, that are determined
by the Council to be therapeutically equivalent to specified brand
name drugs and pharmaceuticals.- 1 5 7 The formulary will then be
distributed to pharmacists and periodically revised. 158 Section 7 of
the act permits parties who are aggrieved by any act of the
Council to seek judicial review in state court.' 59 The act speci-
fically permits a pharmacist who has received a prescription for a
brand name to dispense an equivalent listed in the formulary.' 60
15 4 See part Ill1 B supra.
15 5 Ch. 126 [19721 Ky. Acts 558 et seq. Massachusetts recently enacted a statute per-
mitting a more limited type of substitution. See Note, Products Liability for Prescription
Drugs- The Effects of Generic Substitution on the Consumer and the Pharmacist, 23
SYR. L. REV. 887, 889 n.12 (1972).
156 Ch. 126, §5, [1972] Ky. Acts 559-60.
157 Id. § 6, at 560.
158 1d. § 6, at 561.159 Id. § 7, at 561.
160 Id. §8(1), at 561, provides:
When a pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name drug for which
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He must dispense an equivalent upon the patient's request 161 and
is subject to a fine if he fails to do so. 162 The label on the
dispensed drug must bear the names of both the prescribed and
the dispensed drugs. 163 The act also permits the prescribing physi-
cian to indicate on the prescription that no substitution should be
made, and the pharmacist must honor the prescription as writ-
ten. 164 The last section of the act provides that where a physician
has forbidden substitution a patient must be reimbursed by any
health care insurance contractor at the brand name rather than
generic name price. 165 The act finally provides that the system
was enacted with the "intent ... that all citizens of Kentucky may
be assured of high quality medicine at a reasonable cost."1 66
The Kentucky act permits substitution only where therapeutic
equivalence has been determined. Presumably the Council may
draw on current investigations done by the federal government in
this regard as well as by its own investigation. It is likely, how-
ever, that large sums of money will be needed for clinical trials. It
is probably most appropriate that this be done on the federal level
in order to avoid duplication of effort. 167 The act also gives the
pharmacist a reliable means to determine where equivalency ex-
ists. The language and operation of the act itself do nothing to
regulate the quality of manufacture of pharmaceuticals. Drug
quality may be enforced, however, by preventing certain drugs
from being listed in the formulary. The act does not provide for
large-scale inspection of processing and manufacturing facilities;
nor does it provide for continuing improvement in the approved
national compendia from which the standards of composition are
one or more equivalent drugs are listed in the formulary prepared by the
Drug Formulary Council, he may dispense any one of the listed products and
shall do so if the purchaser so requests, provided however that if such
substitution is made, the label on the container of the drug shall show both
the name of the prescribed drug and the name of the drug dispensed in lieu
thereof.
161 Id.
162 Id. § 9, at 561. Presumably this is aimed at preventing the pharmacist from refusing
to substitute because his profit may be greater on more expensive drugs than it is on less
expensive equivalents.
163 Id. § 8, at 56 1.
164 Id. §§ 8, 9, at 56 1. Section 8 (2) provides in pertinent part:
If, in the opinion of a practitioner, it is to the best interest of his patient that
an equivalent drug should not be dispensed, he may indicate in the manner of
his choice on the prescription "Do Not Substitute," except that the in-
dication shall not be pre-printed on a prescription.
165 Id. § 13, at 562. The intent here must have been to prevent the type of pressures to
which pharmacists and patients are currently subjected by both substitution laws and
reimbursement policies of health insurance or public health care organization.
M Id. § 1I, at 562.
167 The HEW Task Force recommended that clinical investigation be carried out on the
federal level on a high priority basis. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 33.
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drawn. As with clinical trials, these activities are perhaps more
appropriate on the federal level in view of the fact that respon-
sibility for these activities is currently centered there. 168 The
legislation as enacted also permits the physician to override the
pharmacist's choice.
A major difficulty with the Kentucky act is that the pharmacist
still may be liable for misbranding under federal law. Although the
labeling provisions of the act will presumably remove some feder-
al liabilities for misbranding, 169 the pharmacist may still be liable
for dispensing the substituted drug without a prescription. 170 This
problem may be avoided, however, by arguing that the pharmacist
has not dispensed a drug without having received a prescription
for that drug because by state law a prescription for a brand name
automatically includes a prescription for all equivalent phar-
maceuticals listed in the formulary unless the physician specifies
otherwise.
A final difficulty is that the act makes no provision for allocat-
ing losses that may result from the operation of the system. As an
example, assume that the Council has concluded that two brand
names are equivalent. Assume further that a physician writes a
prescription for Brand X, and its "equivalent" Brand Y is dis-
pensed. If the patient is injured as a result, does he have a claim
for relief, and if so, against whom? The pharmacist has certainly
not been negligent, and presumably a law similar to that enacted
in Kentucky removes the prescription as the basis of the bargain.
In effect the pharmacist has only filled the prescription as required
by law and with all due care. He cannot be held liable for per-
forming all that the law requires.1 71 If the damage is the result of a
defect in the product, surely the manufacturer will be liable. The
question remains, however, what will the duties and liabilities of
the Council and the state be. The question may well go unliti-
gated, as has the issue of the liability of the intentional substitu-
tor; 17 2 yet it is a difficulty that should not be overlooked.
Although the Kentucky system has not been in operation long
enough to produce any definitive results, 173 it promises to be a
significant experiment in the law regulating pharmacists. It raises
16 8The HEW Task Force generally advocated more quality-control-oriented action by
the federal government. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at xi-xx.
169 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 502(a), (i) 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a),
(i) (1970).
170 See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra, discussing liabilities under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C. §353(b) (1970).
171 See McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
172 See text accompanying notes 151- 52 supra.
173 The statute was enacted on March 27, 1972.
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anew the specter of liability as "certifiers" for those who formu-
larily assert preference or equivalence in the event of subsequent
patient disservice because of demonstrable nonequivalence or
inefficacy. The act answers many of the criticisms of those who
oppose legal substitution. It does, however, leave gaps in the
areas of testing, certification responsibility, inspection, and quality
control.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to consider the practical and legal impli-
cations of drug substitution. It has further sought to summarize
the arguments bearing on any review of present substitution laws.
In so doing it has attempted to highlight the important problems
which are presented in this context.
Some of the answers to these problems undoubtedly lie in
increased federal administrative and legislative attention to assur-
ing quality pharmaceutical products as the cornerstone of pharma-
cy services throughout the nation. Another answer lies in educat-
ing the medical and pharmacy practitioner, along with elements of
the public, as to what truly comprises pharmaceutical manufac-
turing quality.
In any context, legal reform must reflect the socio-political
goals and economic needs of those who are governed. In in-
stances such as health law, those goals and needs are inextricably
involved with complex scientific issues. As this article has sought
to illustrate, any change in the legal system relating to pharmaceu-
ticals must be predicated on considerations of scientific validity.
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